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This report aims to broaden the horizon of research questions in international 
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collective motivations. More specifically, the report focuses on why the honor motive is 
ignored in the discipline and why it deserves more attention.  
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The intellectual tendency of modern, enlightened, liberal individuals and societies 
is to regard honor as outmoded and archaic. Honor is associated with the relic of 
aristocracy, tribalism, stratified hierarchies, and ridiculous dueling. The notion of honor, 
however, has a long and important lineage in international relations. In Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War, the Athenians famously claim that they are compelled to war by 
“fear, honor, and profit.”1 In fact, according to the Greek historian, honor was the very 
catalyst for the 27-year-long war between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides describes how 
the commercial Corinthians meddled in a strategically reckless quarrel “out of hatred” for 
their adversary, the Corcyraeans, who posed no threat to the Corinthians’ economic or 
security interests. The reason for this hatred was that the Corcyraeans insulted the 
Corinthians and “treated them contemptuously.”2 In response, the Corinthians sought a 
long and bloody conflict to punish those they viewed as their disrespectful subordinates. 
Today, by contrast, the field of international relations has lost sight of honor as a 
motivation. Conventional paradigms and research methods in IR typically bracket any 
examination of motivations. Instead, scholars focus on establishing predictive accuracy 
through parsimonious theories. These theories assume states are motivated not by honor 
but only by what Thucydides called fear and profit, or security interests and economic 
gain. These contemporary theories dismiss or altogether avoid the idea that foreign policy 
is shaped by a spirited moral defense or assertion of one’s individual or national 
                                                 
1 Victor Davis Hanson and Robert B Strassler, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the 
Peloponnesian War  (Free Press, 1998), 1.75-6.  
2 Ibid., 1.25-1.35. 
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worthiness, a desire to escape shame and humiliation, or a prideful desire to avenge 
wrong and restore one’s reputation and moral ideals. When scholars do acknowledge the 
presence of concern for esteem, they typically reduce the phenomenon to an underlying 
concern for greater power, security, and economic gain.  
This report aims to broaden the horizon of research questions in international 
relations by encouraging a greater appreciation for the complexity of individual and 
collective motivations. More specifically, the report focuses on why the honor motive is 
















What Is Honor? 
Honor is the assertion or defense of a principle or cause that transcends expedient, 
materialistic calculations.3 Honorable behavior speaks with the pretense of universal 
principles of justice or self-worth. But honor is always arbitrary in the sense that 
honorable behavior is attached to one’s own concern—whether person, family, property, 
tribe, nation, or ideology. Honor connects one’s private circumstance with a principle and 
its worthiness. Even though honor is the source of self-concern, it is different from the 
concern of self-preservation and wealth because such material considerations are 
subordinated or instrumental to attaining a more intangible desire, such as victory, 
autonomy, or respect. Honorable behavior is done out self-respect, rather than principally 
out of fear of punishment or a reward that goes beyond the personal gratification inherent 
in the action.4 Thus honor can restrain prudential calculation in order to look for the 
greater gratification that is attained by fulfilling moralistic and indignant desire.5 While 
codes of honors are conventional and conditioned by society, honor is a universal 





                                                 
3 Harvey Claflin Mansfield, Manliness  (Yale University Press, 2006). 65. Peter McNamara, The Noblest 
Minds: Fame, Honor, and the American Founding  (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999)., 214. 
4 Sharon R Krause, Liberalism with Honor  (Harvard University Press, 2002). 
5 Thomas L Pangle, "Interpretive Essay," Thomas L. Pangle The Laws of Plato, New York: Basic Books 
(1980). 
6 See Krause, Liberalism with Honor. 
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The Puzzle of Honor in IR 
 Contemporary theories of international relations tend to simply avoid or even 
dismiss “intangible,” moralistic motivations of individuals and nations. Many positivist 
IR theories regard moralistic language and beliefs as a kind of rhetorical or psychological 
shell that either reflects, conceals, or is reducible to underlying structural, material, and 
strategic variables and interests.7 While there is a small (and perhaps growing) 
recognition among IR scholars of the importance of status, prestige, and reputation, there 
have been no serious attempts to demonstrate the existence and importance of honor as an 
irreducible moralistic motivation.8 In one sense, the discipline of IR merely reflects the 
broader cultural and intellectual tendency in the West to regard honor as an antiquated 
and even patriarchal concept that is no longer a relevant or worthy goal.9 
 And yet, when considering concrete cases, it is difficult to deny the perennial and 
irrepressible intuition that honor is a central motive in conflict. One striking example of 
“everyday” honor is France’s national soccer team loss during 2006 World Cup final. In 
that match, France’s star player, Zinedine Zidane, was expelled in the 110
th
 minute of the 
final game after head-butting an Italian opponent who insulted his sister and mother. 
Years later, Zidane said he “would rather die” than apologize to his victim. As he put it, 
                                                 
7 J. Goldsmith and E. Posner, "Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice 
Perspective," U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper, no. 108 (2000). 
8  R. Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition," 
International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 92; B. O'Neill, "Mediating National Honour: Lessons from the Era of 
Dueling," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft (2003); R.N. Lebow, "Fear, Interest and Honour: Outlines of a Theory of International 
Relations," International Affairs 82, no. 3 (2006); S. Joshi, "Honor in International Relations," (Working 
Paper, 2008); E. Abrams and D. Kagan, Honor among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy  
(Ethics & Public Policy Center, 1998). 
9 James Bowman, Honor: A History  (Encounter Books, 2007). 
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he “could never have lived with himself” had he remained in the game instead of 
punishing a man who insulted the honor of his family.10  
Even, or especially, in cases of war—when necessities of material power and 
security concentrate the mind—concern for one’s honor appear in the opinions and 
justifications of statesmen. For example, Thomas Jefferson justified rejection of the 
Barbary Pirates’ demand for tribute in part on the humiliation it would bring the United 
States. Indeed, his war against them was justified as an effort to “chastise their 
insolence.”11  During the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, nearly all of the major delegates 
revealed a desire to subject Germany to a punitive peace. Despite the fact that the terms 
and enforcement mechanisms did not significantly weaken Germany (and arguably, in 
some respects, strengthened the regime), Germany recognized the punitive tone of the 
treaty and perpetually sought to overturn the humiliation.12 During the Vietnam War, 
Lyndon Johnson escalated U.S. involvement on the grounds that “Our national honor is at 
stake in Southeast Asia, and we are going to protect it.” When the war turned into a 
                                                 
10 Zinedine Zidane: I'd "rather die" than say sorry - ESPN Soccernet 
Espnfc.com (2010) Zinedine Zidane: I'd "rather die" than say sorry - ESPN Soccernet. [online] Available 
at: http://espnfc.com/world-cup/story/_/id/749212/ce/uk/?cc=5901 [Accessed: 30 Apr 2013]. 
Zidane is glad he was sent off in 2006 World Cup final | M24 Digital 
M24digital.com (2010) Zidane is glad he was sent off in 2006 World Cup final | M24 Digital. [online] 
Available at: http://m24digital.com/en/2009/12/22/zidane-is-glad-he-was-sent-off-in-the-2006-world-cup-
final/comment-page-1/ [Accessed: 30 Apr 2013].  
11 Allan Dafoe and Devin M Caughey, "Honor and War: Using Southern Presidents to Identify 
Reputational Effects in International Conflict," Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley (2011). 
12 Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace  (New York: Doubleday, 1995). 
M. Trachtenberg, "Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference," The Journal of Modern History (1979). Sally 
Marks, "The Myths of Reparations," Central European History 11, no. 3 (1978). Richard Ned Lebow, A 
Cultural Theory of International Relations  (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008). 
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stalemate, he rejected withdrawal because, he explained, it would dishonor America’s 
commitment.13  
Appeal to honor, it seems, is not merely rhetorical or instrumental. In fact, it is not 
uncommon for commentators and policymakers of all ideological stripes to turn to 
explanations of honor, pride, shame, and humiliation to make sense of global events. For 
example, a recent New York Times op-ed by a former spokesman for Iran's nuclear 
negotiators explained the importance of honor and prestige in influencing Iranian 
incentives.14 Similarly, a recent Wall Street Journal article considered the seemingly 
“bizarre” British aggression over the Falklands that can be explained only by recourse to 
appreciation for pride and honor.15 As columnist Thomas Friedman put it: “If I’ve learned 
one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciate force in 
international relations is humiliation.”16 Friedman was merely echoing something that 
that Henry Kissinger wrote decades before: “no serious policymaker could allow himself 
to succumb to the fictional debunking of prestige or honor or credibility.”17  
The evidence that honor matters goes beyond anecdotes and intuition. It is also 
supported by a broad range of disciplines, especially philosophy, theology, literature, 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Dafoe and Caughey, "Honor and War: Using Southern Presidents to Identify Reputational 
Effects in International Conflict." 
14 Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Mohammad Ali Shabani, “How to Talk to Iran,” The New York Times, 
January 4, 2013. 
15 Bret Stephens, “Why the Falklands Matter: Pride and principle are no small matters in affairs of state,” 
Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2012 
16 The Humiliation Factor - New York Times 
New York Times (2003). The Humiliation Factor - New York Times. [online] Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/opinion/the-humiliation-factor.html [Accessed: 3 May 2013]. 
17 Henry Kissinger, White House Years  (Simon & Schuster, 2011), 228 
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history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and ethnography.18 
Remarkably, however, international relations scholars have made few attempts to 


















                                                 
18 For examples, see Tor Aase, Tournaments of Power: Honor and Revenge in the Contemporary World  
(Ashgate Pub Limited, 2002); Richard E Nisbett and Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychology of 
Violence in the South  (Westview Press, 1996); Blema S Steinberg, Shame and Humiliation: Presidential 
Decision Making on Vietnam  (Cambridge Univ Press, 1996). 
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Honor in Theoretical Context 
What explains the massive gap between, on the one hand, what is widely 
recognized as an important phenomenon in understanding conflict and, on the other hand, 
the analytical tendency of international relations to ignore or dismiss it? The answer is 
rooted in the theoretical and methodological origin of the modern conception of honor, 
represented by the thought of Thomas Hobbes. The theoretical approaches of modern 
political science, especially rational choice theory, can be understood as an embrace or 
continuation of the normative goals of Hobbes’ political science. These normative goals 
effectively conceal any serious understanding of the moral dimensions of honor, and have 
contributed to the foundational assumptions across modern IR approaches and paradigms 













I. The Roots of Modern Honor 
 International relations theorists draw on Hobbes as a philosophical 
authority on the primacy of security and self-preservation. Yet they usually ignore the 
great emphasis on what he saw to be the universal and powerful drive for honor. Without 
being fully aware of it, modern political scientists have embraced Hobbes’ normative 
intentions that sought to orient political science (and political society) around the goals of 
material self-interest. But while modern scholars assume that these goals encompass the 
core truth about human needs, Hobbes had no basis for making such assumptions. He 
lived at a time when concerns of honor were so obvious that their existence and 
worthiness could be taken for granted. In fact, the three principal causes of quarrel for 
Hobbes are security, economic gain, and concern for glory or reputation.19 Not 
surprisingly, then, one of the most prominent themes of Hobbes’ mature works is the 
troublesome and destructive nature of honor-oriented behavior. His project was based on 
the belief that it was possible to educate or enlighten men sufficiently so that political 
society security and material self-interest as the most important goods that no rational 
being should ever sacrifice. As one scholar explains, Thomas Hobbes “represents a clear 
turning point in Western society’s conception of honor.”20 Returning to Hobbes reveals 
the way in which the modern dismissal of honor stems from an intellectually conditioned, 
normative view that peace and security are worthier and more rational than seeking and 
maintaining honor.  
                                                 
19“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, 
diffidence; thirdly, glory.” Thomas Hobbes and Ian Shapiro, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, & Power of 
a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill  (Yale University Press, 2010), Chapter 13. 
20 Laurie M Johnson Bagby, Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor  (Lexington Books, 2009).5 
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The pre-modern or pre-Hobbesian understanding of honor nearly equated the 
notion with moral behavior. Honor was a motivation, reward, or symbol of behaving 
admirably, and that meant behaving in accordance with moral and religious virtue. Both 
in ancient, biblical, and medieval thought, behaving honorably was associated with 
courage or sacrificing one’s private interests for a transcendent good. Honor therefore 
included an underlying belief in a God or cosmic order that exhorts noble self-sacrifice.21  
Hobbes’ mature works can be understood as a campaign against this ancient and 
medieval view that the purpose of politics is moral fulfillment and the salvation of the 
soul.  
For Hobbes, an exalted conception of self-fulfillment encourages behavior that 
leads to civil strife, including the horrific religious wars of his own day. His famously 
brutal picture of the state of nature in the Leviathan seeks to show how dangerous life is 
when what vanity and honor inebriates an individual. Honor leads to an exaggerated 
sense of self-importance, and to blindness to the most essential good, security.22 Hobbes 
therefore sought to show the misguidedness and destructiveness of heroism and religious 
martyrdom. 
Hobbes disparaged honor by showing that the phenomenon is reducible to 
perceptions of power. Honor “is nothing else but the estimation of another’s power; and 
therefore he that hath least power, hath always least honour.”23 Power is a kind of 
currency that buys human needs and desires. Thus, honor contains no inherent rational 
                                                 
21 “For Hobbes, someone who believes in the reality of honor instead of understanding it as foolish vanity 
does not really understand the world and thus plays the part of the fool.” Ibid., 17.  
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive  (Kessinger Publishing, 2004), Chapter 14. 
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dignity; it is intelligent only insofar as it contributes to attaining security and material 
goods.24 Reason, Hobbes says, is the calculation involved in attaining these basic needs, a 
“scout and spy” of the passions that helps individuals fulfill their basest desires and 
interests.25  
Honor not only has no inherent rational dignity, but also no inherent moral 
dignity.  As one scholar puts it, for Hobbes, “honor was almost entirely rhetorical, devoid 
of moral content.”26 In that spirit, the English philosopher ridiculed the lofty rhetoric and 
decorative insignias of the aristocrats on his day as the bogus façade that aggrandizes 
power. Honor is ornamental and frivolous because human beings are fundamentally 
equal. This equality is evident in the basic fact that every individual is hypothetically 
capable of killing another. Once this basic equality is recognized, man can lose the 
delusions about seeking fulfillment through virtue and recognize that rational self-interest 
is survival. The social contract is the acknowledgment that the government’s foremost 
duty is to protect every individual’s basic goods from others.27  
In sum, Hobbes argued against the pre-modern notion that honor is duty that 
transcends self-interest. He promoted a new conception of honor whose only rational 
basis lies in its purchase of attaining the earthly goods of power, security, and economic 
                                                 
24 Laurence Berns, “Thomas Hobbes,” in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy, 
2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
25 T. Hobbes and A.R. Waller, Leviathan: Or, the Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth, 
Ecclesiasticall and Civill  (University Press, 1904), 45. 
26 Bagby, Thomas Hobbes: Turning Point for Honor, 25. 
27 Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Its Genesis  (University of Chicago 
Press, 1963), 23-9; Devin Stauffer, "Reopening the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns: Leo 
Strauss's Critique of Hobbes's “New Political Science”," American Political Science Review 101, no. 02 
(2007). 
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gain. Hobbes’ civic mission was to “enlighten” societies by lowering moral goals, 
making them more achievable and realistic, and therefore societies more stable and 
peaceful.28  
Precisely because Hobbes has been so successful, and his key claims so 
internalized in Westerners’ habits of mind, it is difficult to see that the prevailing belief 
that security and material goods are the overriding concern of human beings is based on a 
normative and polemical project. The idea that basic appetitive goods encompass 
individual and collective motivation is a relatively recent phenomenon—and one that is 
certainly not accepted universally. As Donald Kagan puts it, “The notion that the only 
thing rational or real in the conduct of nations is the search for economic benefits or 
physical security is itself a prejudice of our time.”29 It is paradoxical (though, given 
Hobbes’ success, not surprising) that Hobbes, who emphasized the irrationality of man, 
contributed, through his normative goals, to the massive tendency of political science 
toward rationalistic conceptions of human behavior. As a founder of modern political 
science, Hobbes’ thought reveals the origin of the scientific disposition to reduce moral 
motivations to materialistic motivations. 
II. The Limits of Rational Choice Theory in International Relations 
 The massive appeal of rational choice theory in international relations suggests 
that Hobbes’ science continues to be immensely influential. While the theory originated 
recently (in the 1950s), rational choice represents “the continuation of the tendency of 
                                                 
28 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History, Charles R Walgreen Foundation Lectures (Chicago,: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953). Mark Lilla, The Stillborn God : Religion, Politics, and the Modern West  (New 
York: Knopf, 2007). 
29 Donald Kagan, "Honor, Interest, and the Nation-State," Honor Among Nations (1998). 
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modern social science following modern natural science to understand complex wholes in 
light of their simple elements.”30 By importing economics’ premise that human beings 
are rational beings who aim to maximize their utility, rational choice theory explicitly 
avoids investigation of the psychological basis of motivations. For rational choice 
theorists, evidence against human rationality is irrelevant because, as Anthony Downs 
explains, “theoretical models should be tested primarily by the accuracy of their 
predictions rather than by the reality of their assumptions.”31 Instead of investigating the 
beliefs actors hold at the start of the interaction, the theory focuses on behavior, or 
preferences over actions, and seeks to show the conditions under which pattern of actions 
emerge.32 Rational choice theory’s focus on predictive accuracy and verifiable relations 
rather than examination of human motivations and goals has contributed to its powerful 
analytical purchase and embrace in international relations.33  
There is nothing inherent in rational choice theory that prevents analysis of non-
rational goals; rational choice theory is agnostic to the origin of preferences. Any 
conceivable goal (including a moral, non-material one such as honor) can be entered into 
a utility function.34 In practice, however, theorists rarely stray from preconceived 
Hobbesian understandings of human goals. Because the origins of preferences are 
exogenous, the theory uncritically relies on preconceived modern, economistic 
                                                 
30 Nasser Behnegar, Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics  (University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), 24. 
31 Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Democracy," (1957), 27. 
32 J. Fearon and A. Wendt, "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," Handbook of 
international relations (2002). 
33 Duncan Snidal, "Rational Choice and International Relations," 73. 
34 J. Fearon and A. Wendt, "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." 
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understandings of human goals. One reason for this is that these economistic assumptions 
are not arbitrary; they are plausible, substantive, and contribute to an understanding of 
individual and collective behavior. Another reason is more subconscious and normative: 
IR scholars believe in the worthiness of Hobbesian goals. After all, international relations 
scholars pick their cases and questions not randomly but in order to understand the causes 
of conflict and destruction and to understand what might contribute to peace, cooperation, 
and prosperity.35 Indeed, some postmodernists argue that rational choice theory promotes 
a certain normative view by uncritically assuming it.36 
When rational choice does consider intangible goals, another major limitation of 
the theory emerges. Rational choice theorists follow Hobbes in artificially separating 
reason and desire. This relies on the assumption that a goal can be separated from the 
strategic calculation aimed to achieve it and remain empirically relevant. The problem 
with this is that separating means and ends has the consequences of treating all behavior 
and speech that is inconsistent with the goal as strategic means or a kind of currency that 
is purely instrumental. Rational choice is not concerned with the question of how desires 
and reasoning interact and mix in ways that, for example, leads to the actors’ own 




                                                 
35 Catherine H Zuckert, "On The'rationality'of Rational Choice," Political Psychology (1995). 
36 Ibid., 184. 
37 Ibid., 190. 
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III. The Limits of Conventional IR Paradigms 
There is nothing necessarily “unscientific” about ontological simplifications and 
normative assumptions. Still, a lack of self-awareness about smuggling normative 
ontology, combined with a commitment to predictive accuracy, can easily distort the rich 
complexities of human behavior. As the predominant paradigm of contemporary IR, 
realism reflects the costs of sacrificing empirical richness for parsimonious elegance. As 
one scholar puts it, “by embracing the notion of homo economicus,” realists have sought 
“to ‘operationalize’ a prescriptive political philosophy according to the categories of 
contemporary social science and to endow it with predictive power.”38 The ontological 
and methodological commitments by realists contributed to the widespread view among 
all IR paradigms that beliefs, opinions, and ideologies are merely a smokescreen that 
conceal or merely reflect material structures and materialistic motivations.39 Indeed, from 
a non-Hobbesian perspective, the divisions among IR paradigms is merely a family 
quarrel. Liberalism and Marxism, after all, follow realism’s scientific and ontological 
assumptions and reduce motivations (including honor) to the maximization of 
materialistic goals.40 According to these paradigms, much of state behavior can be 
accounted for by the postulate that security and economic gain drives human behavior.  
Realists acknowledge that states are concerned with how they are estimated by 
others. However, consistent with their interpretation that power is not only a material but 
                                                 
38 Michael Loriaux, "The Realists and Saint Augustine: Skepticism, Psychology, and Moral Action in 
International Relations Thought," International Studies Quarterly (1992). 
39 Morgenthau Hans, "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace," New York 
51973(1948), 10, 86-7, 95-6.  
40 Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries  
(Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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also a psychological phenomenon, realists view honor as an instrumental rather than a 
moral phenomenon.41 These scholars typically talk not so much of honor as of prestige, 
status, or standing—that is, perceptions of power that are ultimately grounded in security 
concerns.42 Hans Morgenthau defines prestige as the “reputation for power,” and even 
that, he says, is “rarely the primary objective of foreign policy.”43 A similar view is 
echoed by John Herz, who writes that “Striving for prestige means striving for 
security.”44 Similarly, Robert Gilpin equates prestige with the perception of state’s 
power.45 With Kenneth N. Waltz, realism departed even further from the psychological 
dimensions of honor. Waltz explicitly abstracts “from every attribute of states except 
their capabilities” in order to explain state behavior according to the universal constraints 
on states imposed on them by the anarchical structure of the international system.46 When 
Waltz does discuss state motivations, he collapses all of them to a desire for wealth and 
security.47   
More recently, John Mearsheimer has argued that great powers are in an 
“unrelenting pursuit of power,” defined largely by material capability, with the goal of 
hegemony and for the ultimate sake of survival.48 For Mearsheimer, power is a 
                                                 
41 One exception is Raymond Aron, who takes a more open view to human goals. Raymond Aron, Peace 
and War  (Cambridge Univ Press, 1966). 
42 William C Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," World Politics 61, no. 
1 (2009). 
43 Hans, "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace," 10, 94. 
44 John H Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, a Study in Theories and Realities  (University of 
Chicago Press, 1951)., 4-5. 
45 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics  (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31. 
46 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, vol. 5 (McGraw-Hill New York, 1979), 99. 
47 Kenneth N Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International security 25, no. 1 (2000). 
48 J.J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics  (W. W. Norton, 2003), 2. 
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“currency,” or a “means” to other ends, foremost of which is security.49 Mearsheimer 
does not deny that states seek far more than merely security. “In fact,” he says in a buried 
footnote, “it is uncertainty about whether those non-security causes of war are at play, or 
might come into play, that pushes great power to worry about their survival and thus act 
offensively.”50 This raises the question of whether security is sought for its own sake, or 
whether it is itself a “currency,” for example, for the maintenance and promotion of a 
certain regime or conception of justice. If so, this would help explain why Mearsheimer 
himself does not hesitate to make harsh normative judgments about illiberal regimes.51 
Unfortunately, Mearsheimer, like most of his intellectual kindred, leaves utterly 
unexamined what motivates states. For realists, it is enough for a theory to arrive at 
accurate predictions through plausible assumptions. 
The inadequacies of conventional paradigms has fueled fresh doubts about the 
usefulness of thinking in terms of paradigms.52 It has also contributed to the growing 
movement of constructivism that seeks to underline the pitfalls of materialism.53 
However, despite their fruitful criticisms, constructivists tend to focus on interaction and 
do not attempt to understand the intellectual and psychological character of phenomena 
they typically refer to as socialization, ideas, or identity.54 Indeed, some constructivist 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 12, 60. 
50 Ibid., 414, n.8. 
51 Ibid., 217, 401. 
52 David A Lake, "Why “Isms” Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to 
Understanding and Progress," International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011). 
53 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics  (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
54 For example, Martha Finnemore argues shows how the Genovese-Swiss banker Henry Dunant had a 
major impact on establishing humanitarian norms and the International Committee of the Red Cross. She 
does not, however, attempt to understand the intellectual origin of Dunant’s own understanding. Martha 
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and rationalist scholars argue, with some justification, that the difference between 
constructivism and rational choice is largely overblown.55 
What lessons can be taken from the limits of mainstream methodologies and 
paradigms in studying motivations in international relations? At least in the conventional 
positivist sense, there is no way to “prove” the existence of any motivation. There is 
therefore little point in ruling out any methodologies or paradigms because they fail to 
confirm specific motivations. Every approach must make “methodological bets” that 
confront certain tradeoffs, for example, between messy but rich detail and abstract but 
elegant theories.56  However, a good case can be made that examining the importance of 
honor as an irreducible moral phenomenon is best achieved through a method that 
embraces the complicated messiness of human behavior, and tries to observe the multiple 
psychological dimensions of its apparent manifestation. The method of process tracing, 
whereby cases are broken into a series of observations, is perhaps a particularly 
promising way to undertake such a study.57 There are, of course, significant downsides to 
such an approach.58 Nevertheless, process tracing could help adjudicate among 
alternative hypotheses about motivations that so far go largely unexamined in the field.59 
One potential path is to devise artificial, paradigmatic models that assume the primacy of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1996). 
55 Fearon and Wendt, "Rationalism V. Constructivism: A Skeptical View." 
56 David A Lake, "The State and International Relations," The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations, pbk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) (2007). 
57 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science  (Cornell University Press, 
1997), 77 
58 These include the problem of infinite regress. Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research  (Princeton University Press, 1994), 
86. 
59 Andrew Bennett, "Process Tracing and Causal Inference," (2010), 208.  
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security interests and economic gain. Doing so in specific historical cases could help 
illuminate the inadequacy of these motivations and the importance of building a more 






The premise of this report is the gap between, on the one hand, the apparent 
omnipresence of honor, and, on the other hand, its relative absence in the field of 
international relations. The paper summarized the conceptual transition from pre-modern 
to modern honor in order to show the roots of the prevailing ontological and 
methodological beliefs about honor and honor’s significance (and non-significance) in 
international relations. The limits of conventional methodologies and paradigms conveys 
that the study of honor in in international relations must begin from a fresh examination 
of the phenomenon. The first task must be to establish that honor actually matters, and to 
cast doubt that existing theories for their failure to notice or appreciate the phenomenon. 
This report attempted to take the first step by problematizing common assumptions in IR 
and encouraging a renewed openness to studying motivations. The hope is that the 
arguments here could raise new research questions, while encouraging a more flexible 
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